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Abstract
Strategic communications has vaulted to the top of  the agenda for governments in the 
West in the vain hope that it might solve a seemingly intractable conflict with jihadist 
groups, an adversary whose ideology seems to be an essential part of  its life-force. 
However, these governments have failed to grasp why these groups are more adept 
at using stories to animate their adherents toward the achievement of  strategic ends. 
Unlike Western governments, jihadists use communication to support their use of  force. 
They treat strategic communications as an intrinsic element of  war. Consequently, the 
internal coherence of  their messages is greater and more persuasive. Moreover, their 
propaganda cadres are also nimbler; while they form a loose, decentralised network, 
they act in accordance with mission command principles, galvanised by a clear sense 
of  the commander’s intent and a higher tolerance for risk. Indeed, the West’s failed 
use of  strategic communications reveals a startling ignorance of  several of  Carl Von 
Clausewitz’s principles and arguments, not least the importance of  understanding the 
kind of  war upon which one embarks.  
Keywords: countering violent extremism, jihadism, technology, storytelling, strategic communication, 
strategic communications
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Institute, Philadelphia, PA. His research focuses on technology and war, primarily. 
His most recent book is Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of  Conventional 
Military Power.  
Vaughan Phillips is an independent researcher who studies the intersection between 
technology, communication, and violent extremism. He recently published ‘The Islamic 
State’s Strategy: Bureaucratising the Apocalypse Through Strategic Communications’ 
in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 
Introduction
In 2006 Donald Rumsfeld lamented that the Taliban was out-communicating the 
United States in Afghanistan.1 A year later his successor Robert Gates voiced similar 
incredulity about al-Qaida’s relative success in the discursive skirmishes of  the War on 
Terror: ‘How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest 
communication society?’2 More recently it has been observed of  Islamic State that even 
as its physical presence in its Syrian and Iraqi heartland is rolled back, its ‘virtual’ presence 
in the minds of  incipient jihadists3 elsewhere, particularly in Europe, is growing. 
Why? Why are the strategic communications of  the West—the American and European 
governments that promote liberal democracy—so poor relative to armed groups with 
far fewer resources at their disposal? Is it because of  the ‘postmodern’ Zeitgeist of  
skepticism towards civilisational metanarratives that the educational system has 
inculcated for the last two generations?4 Is it that the hierarchical, centralised, and rule-
based structures of  Western states render them less nimble than the decentralised, 
flattened hierarchies of  their opponents who, moreover, are relatively freer to play fast 
and loose with the truth? There is something to such arguments, as we shall see, but the 
thesis we propose is harder and more fundamental. 
The jihadist armed groups that oppose the West have enjoyed, and will in all likelihood 
continue to enjoy, results that are more congenial to their interests for one primary 
1 Rumsfeld, Donald, ‘New Realities in the Media Age’, Council on Foreign Relations speech (New York: 
17 February 2006).
2 Gates, Robert, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University (Manhattan, KS: 26 November 2007). 
3  To be understood in this article as groups and individuals which maintain that violence is necessary to 
bring about an authentic Islamic form of  governance. Zelin, Aaron, ‘From the Archduke to the Caliph’ 
in The First World War and Its Aftermath: The Shaping of  the Modern Middle East, T.G. Frasier (ed.), (London: 
The Gingko Library, 2015), p. 164.
4 On which point see Bloom, Allan, The Closing of  the American Mind: How Higher Education has Failed De-
mocracy and Impoverished the Souls of  Today’s Students (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).  
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reason: there is strategy in their strategic communications, whereas in those of  the 
West there is not. They are winning the ‘war of  ideas’ because they actually treat it as 
a war in which words and deeds are deployed in concert towards the achievement of  
specific plausible objectives. Consequently, their communicative strategies possess more 
persuasive traction because they serve objectives that are profoundly more internally 
coherent. They are less frequently bedevilled by credibility failures because the gap 
between what they say and what they do is generally small, and where it is not their 
adherents are more forgiving of  the discrepancy. Their propaganda cadres operate 
more nimbly in accordance with mission command principles because the commander’s 
intent is clear.            
In this paper we consciously operationalise the concept of  strategic communications 
rather more narrowly than is typically done in the literature. In our view, all 
communications may be more or less purposeful, but it is only the context of  war, 
in which violence is threatened or actual, that renders them ‘strategic’. The reasons 
we define ‘strategic communications’ so strictly are fourfold. First, a strict definition 
renders clarity to a concept that is otherwise flabby and prone to endless dancing-on-
the-head-of-a-pin definitional debate. Second, it is useful for generating insights from 
our case studies; our definition illuminates the dependency of  compelling narrative on 
clarity of  purpose, and the way in which discursive means (as all arms of  war) reach 
their full potential only as part of  a combination of  forces and not in isolation. Third, 
it is the only intellectually defensible approach that squares the dominant philosophy of  
war (which ostensibly is the central pillar of  these discussions) with the myriad other 
theories, ideas, concepts about the workings of  the world that are brought to bear on 
discussions of  strategic matters. Fourth, it is the view that best connects our analytical 
efforts with the canonical works on propaganda that ought to be the starting point of  
any deliberation on strategic communications. In his classic text on the subject, the very 
first point Jacques Ellul strove to impress upon the reader was that propaganda exists 
only because of  a ‘will to action’—its purpose is to ‘arm’ policy and give ‘irresistible 
power’ to its decisions:
…in war, propaganda is an attempt to win victory with a minimum of  physical 
expense. Before the war, propaganda is a substitute for physical violence; during the war 
it is a supplement to it.5 
In other words, the context of  strategic communications is war; its only point is to 
serve the aims of  the war at hand alongside other instruments in a primary, secondary, 
or tertiary role in accordance with the war’s course and character. To pretend instead, 
5 Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda: The Formation of  Men’s Attitudes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. x, n. 2 
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as currently is normally done, that strategic communications exists in a sort of  
superposition of  war/not war is an invitation to confusion, self-deception, and ultimate 
defeat.         
What is war? 
‘War is an act of  force to compel an enemy to do our will.’ This, of  course, is the well-
known formulation of  Carl Von Clausewitz in On War, the ur-text of  the study of  war 
in the West.6 The problem here is not that the idea of  applying this definition to strategic 
communications requires stretching the concept of  force to include non-kinetic means. 
Contemporary scholarship is clearly open to the notion that war involves a discursive 
component; indeed, it is argued not infrequently that this discursive component, or 
‘virtual dimension’ as we have described it elsewhere, betimes supersedes the non-
discursive.7 Nor, we suppose, would Clausewitz himself  disagree. 
It follows intrinsically and logically from his other, even more famous, proposition that 
war is the extension of  politics by other means—which is to say that it lies upon a 
spectrum of  political persuasion in which parties decide in one way or another the 
essential questions of  who gets what, when, and how.8 It is even more powerfully 
embedded in his philosophical conception of  war as a trinity of  chance, political 
purpose, and passion—the last, which is the province above all of  the people, being 
that upon which the other elements of  the triad are co-dependent.9 Attacking the base 
of  the will of  one’s opponent, therefore, and bolstering the sustaining passion of  one’s 
own base, is as vital to war as the clashing of  arms and the making of  political and 
strategic decisions.10
Even more pertinent—perhaps especially in the cases under review here—is recognition 
that the practice of  strategic communications as an aspect of  warlike endeavour and, 
concomitantly, as an essential component of  strategy, requires the existence of  a political 
aim—a condition of  the world that one’s will is directed at realising. 
6 Von Clausewitz, Carl, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds.), On War (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Everyman’s Library, 1993), p. 83. 
7 Betz, David, ‘The Virtual Dimension of  Contemporary Insurgency and Counter Insurgency’, Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, № 4 (2008), p. 513. The point is also made by Smith, Rupert, The Utility of  
Force: The Art of  War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 286 & 289.
8 Lasswell, Harold, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).    
9 Clausewitz, p. 101.  
10 See Smith, M.L.R., ‘Politics and Passion: The Neglected Mainspring of  War’, Infinity Journal, Vol. 4, №. 
2 (2014), pp. 32–36.   
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What is strategy? 
Strategy has been varyingly described. Clausewitz did so, too narrowly for contemporary 
liking, as the use of  battles for the achievement of  the aims of  war. This was adequate 
for the wars of  his time, which could be—and were—decided by the physical contest 
of  armies on the battlefield.11 Nowadays it is more satisfyingly described as the ‘art’ of  
creating power (which may comprise various forms, including persuasive and non-kinetic 
ones) for the purposes of  policy.12 Strategy is often likened metaphorically to a bridge 
connecting military means with political ends.13 It is also sometimes conceptualised as 
the directive quality by which policy is enacted at the tactical level.14 
These conceptions are not mutually exclusive. For the purposes at hand what is germane 
to all of  them is that they depend upon the existence of  a political object. Without such, 
the art of  unleashing power amounts to random splattering, the strategy bridge goes 
nowhere and abuts on nothing, and tactics, howsoever furiously performed, constitute 
little but the noise before defeat. 
At the present time the strategic communications of  the West are astrategic. They evoke 
no specifically desired end state beyond, perhaps, the restoration of  a beleaguered 
status quo to a state of  normality that a significant fraction of  the world considers 
to be invidious. At best, they are reactive—seeking to establish what was summed up 
at a NATO Defence College conference in April 2015, as a ‘counter-narrative which 
calls a lie a lie, and spreads the “truth” [whatever that may be]’.15 This is particularly 
evident in ongoing efforts to use strategic communications for counter-narrative work. 
These communications are not clear, even on the identity of  the enemy, refusing to 
name anyone as such. Rather they rest their arguments upon implied foes and appeal to 
imagined values-based constituencies, whereas the actual constituencies are themselves 
in fractured turmoil. The latter point is especially strategically debilitating as it means 
not only is there a vague ‘they’ against whose will there is some contest, there is an 
equally vague ‘we’ upon whose passions there is no explicit mythic calling. 
What is strategic communications?
‘Strategic communications’ is more variably defined than either war or strategy. There 
is little commonality between governments on what it means; even within the same 
11 Addington, Larry, The Patterns of  War Since the Eighteenth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1984).  
12 Gray, Colin, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).      
13 Ibid.  
14 Strachan, Hew, The Direction of  War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).   
15 Research Division, NATO Defence College, ‘NATO and the New Ways of  Warfare: Defeating Hybrid 
threats’, NDC Conference Report, №.3/15 (May 2015), p. 8.
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government interpretations of  its meaning differ between ministries, in particular 
between those run by soldiers and those run by diplomats.16 It might be said, following 
from the above, that strategic communications is essentially the act of  ‘communicating 
purposively’ in order to advance the ‘mission of  an organization or cause’.17 In other 
words, it is propaganda—communication aimed at swaying the beliefs of  someone or 
some group, but in the interests of  someone else or some other group (normally that 
of  the propagandist).18 
Nowadays, no good propagandist would describe his or her function with that term 
because, at least in the West, the legitimacy of  ‘propaganda’ as such was destroyed 
in the crucible of  the World Wars. Not since Lord Beaverbrook, the media magnate 
and First World War British propaganda chief, described Jesus Christ as ‘The Divine 
Propagandist’ would a strategic communicator voluntarily wear that label.19 Nonetheless, 
it is the case that strategic communications, per se, is not new. Neolithic cave paintings 
publicly commemorate victories to galvanize friends and intimidate enemies.20 
Yet it will not do simply to define strategic communications as communications 
with a purpose because all communication is purposeful—whether it is to inform 
or to amuse, to request or to command, to plead or to proselytise, to frighten or to 
soothe, all communication is imbued with some essential intent. What makes strategic 
communications strategic is that it transpires within a context that is suffused by 
violence or the threat of  violence. One belligerent party wishes that the other take 
a course of  action contrary to its normal desire. It attempts, therefore, to sway the 
other to that end by means that, should words alone fail, may include causing pain and 
destroying wealth.21 It may be argued that diplomacy and other forms of  purposeful 
communications conducted prior to the escalation of  events to actual conflict, and with 
the desire to avoid such conflict, constitutes a sort of  strategic communications; but 
even then it is the shadow of  threatened violence, more or less dimly perceived, that 
renders these communications strategic.  
16 Farwell, James P., Persuasion and Power: The Art of  Strategic Communication (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2012), p. xviii. 
17 Hallahan, Kirk, Derina Holtzhausen, Betteke van Ruler, Dejan Verčič, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, 
‘Defining Strategic Communication’, Journal of  Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, №. 1 (2007), p. 4.  
18 Taylor, Philip, Munitions of  the Mind: A History of  Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, 3rd 
edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 7.
19 Beaverbrook, Max Aitken, The Divine Propagandist (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1962). 
20 Ingram, Haroro J., ‘A Brief  History of  Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter Terrorism 
Strategic Communications’, ICCT Research Paper, (June 2016), p. 6, https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-LATEST.pdf.   
21 Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 2.
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This rather raises the question: Why the fuss? What so suddenly has vaulted strategic 
communications (howsoever labelled) to such heights of  military consternation and 
policy-makers’ perturbation, as it now seemingly demands, if  it has always been a central 
aspect of  war? 
In a nutshell, the answer is technology; which in itself  is saying very little in the context 
of  war’s physical dimension. In that aspect of  war change is frequent; though typically 
incremental rather than revolutionary.22 Armies that fail to keep up with the constant 
pace of  warfighting adaptation lose, sometimes exceedingly demonstratively, which is 
why the technology of  war is more or less the meat and bread of  traditional military 
history. By contrast, technological change in the discursive aspect of  war is extremely 
slow and actually always revolutionary because of  its rarity. There have really only been 
four profound changes in communications technology that matter in terms of  their 
effect upon the art of  persuasive discourse from Plato and Cicero’s day to our own: 
●	 Mass literacy, which is roughly coincident with mechanical print—a 
development that was characterised by the advent of  the pamphlet wars 
and helped fuel the particular ferocity of  the wars of  the Reformation;23
●	 Mass communication, which comes with the twinning of  print with power 
(first steam and then electric)—a development that saw the advent of  the 
modern newspaper and is associated with the age of  revolution, as the 
late eighteenth through early twentieth century is sometimes described;24 
●	 Radio and television, which added a degree of  immediacy and, 
especially with the latter, a layer of  emotional verisimilitude to mass 
communication—a development typically credited with the arrival of  the 
concept of  the ‘living-room war’ and the ‘CNN effect’;25 and
●	 The Internet, which (for the time being) has substantially diminished the 
power of  editors and censors to shape information content and control 
its flow—a development generally supposed to have powered a new era 
22 There exists a large literature on this subject amongst the most useful of  which is Macgregor Knox 
and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of  Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
23 See MacCulloch, Diarmaid, Christianity: The First 3000 Years (London: Penguin, 2009), Chap. 17. 
24 See Briggs, Asa, and Peter Burke, A Social History of  the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet, 3rd edn 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010), chap. 4 on technology and media. It was Eric Hobsbawm who coined The Age 
of  Revolution (London: Abacus, 1992). Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly chose a different periodisation 
and a more social science approach in The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930 (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 
1975).    
25 Livingston, Steven, and Todd Easchus, ‘Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the 
CNN Effect Reconsidered’, Political Communication, Vol. 12, № 4 (1995), pp. 413–429.  
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of  variously described ‘diffused’ or ‘hybrid’ wars and to have enhanced the 
strategic reach of  violent non-state actors.26   
Everything else is incidental. The trouble for today’s strategic communicators is that 
they are right at the eye of  the storm brought about by the most recent inflection point 
and find, therefore, equanimity to be elusive.
The Power of  Stories
Until quite recently it was common to separate humans from other animals by our 
relative propensity to fashion and use tools. Homo habilis, the ‘handy man’, one of  
modern man’s distant ancestors, is so named because of  his innovative use of  stone 
flakes and hammers for butchery and for smashing open large bones to obtain the 
calorie-rich marrow inside. One might as easily talk of  ‘storytelling man’—one who 
uses language for the propagation and preservation of  knowledge. Stories are intrinsic 
to human experience and bound tightly with our biological and societal evolution.27 It 
has even been said that humans are ‘primates whose cognitive capacity shuts down in 
the absence of  a story’.28
Clearly, as noted above, the means of  communicating stories changes, albeit slowly, 
from, say, the fireside telling of  the Homeric legend of  Achilles by Greek orators 
working from memory 2,500 years ago to Brad Pitt’s more recent cinematic portrayal of  
him downloadable in digital form in seconds to the machine on which these words are 
now being written. Equally obviously, the volume of  stories has expanded enormously. 
Yet, as has often been noted, all over the world, for as long as we are able to observe 
them, the stories emerging from the imaginations of  men and women are remarkably 
few in basic form.29 
Despite this similarity, to a degree that is much greater than we typically consciously 
realise, we look at the world through these stories. We naturally see our own lives, as 
well as those of  others, as stories progressing by chapters and episodes of  large and 
small importance. And through media, of  varying forms, we also see public life as 
an ever-shifting kaleidoscope of  stories, complete with heroes and villains and happy 
26 Hoskins, Andrew, and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media: The Emergence of  Diffused War (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2010). 
27 Gottschall, Jonathan, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (New York: Mariner, 2013) 
and Boyd, Brian, On the Origin of  Stories: Evolution, Cognition, Fiction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009).   
28  Dawes, Robyn M., ‘A Message from Psychologists to Economists: Mere Predictability Doesn’t Matter 
Like it Should (without a Good Story Appended to it)’, Journal of  Economic Behavior and Organisation, Vol. 
39, № 1 (1999), p. 29.
29 Booker, Christopher, The Seven Basic Plots: Why we Tell Stories (London: Continuum, 2004). 
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and unhappy endings.30 Students of  literature have long recognised the centrality of  
story in human affairs, as well as its confoundingly simultaneous fecund diversity and 
static repetitiveness. In like vein, psychologists have long argued that we are driven to 
perceive and to act upon the world as we do on account of  unconscious programming 
of  varying sorts—Carl Jung, for instance, spoke of  ‘archetypes’.31 
The ‘narrative turn’ in social sciences on the whole is of  more recent vintage. What 
started as a trickle in 1960s continental philosophy, building on literary theory, became 
a flood by the late 1970s and early 1980s. The study of  the world through the prism 
of  the creation, interpretation, and reinterpretation of  stories caught on with scholars 
more generally, in part because it seemed to square with parallel developments in the 
study of  cognition and culture.32 Not only were these ideas applied in the world of  
policy, particularly social policy, they also came to inform the techniques of  anti-status-
quo social movements—such as those agitating for civil rights, women’s liberation, and 
anti-colonialism. In these realms the idea that relative material powerlessness could be 
balanced by better stories had an obviously attractive strategic rationale.33 
Thus emerged a large and thriving literature on the role of  narrative framing in social 
mobilisation, initially concerned primarily with non-violent movements but more 
recently increasingly preoccupied with violent non-state actors.34 We understand 
narrative as being not simply a story but rather a system of  stories, themes, and archetypes 
that is both open-ended and participative.35 New stories constantly arise, refreshing 
the narrative and changing it in ways that over time may seem flatly contradictory to 
the outside observer, while seeming utterly consistent from the inside. Four centuries 
of  Irish narrative of  resistance to English rule, for instance, have evoked themes as 
disparate as Catholic mysticism, romantic nationalism, and secular Marxism.36
30 Booker, p. 573. 
31 Idem, p. 11–12. 
32 Freedman, Strategy: A History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 429. 
33 Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’, 
International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1, № 1 (1988), pp. 197–217.   
34 See Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press, 2004). 
35 Corman, Steven R., ‘Understanding the Role of  Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication’, in 
L. Fenstermacher & T. Leventhal (eds.), Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies (Wash-
ington, DC: NSI Inc., 2015), p. 37; and Corman, Steven R., ‘The Difference Between Story and Narra-
tive’, ASU Centre for Strategic Communication Blog. (21 March 2013),    
http://csc.asu.edu/2013/03/21/the-difference-between-story-and-narrative/.
36 Bolt, Neville, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries (London: Hurst, 2012), p. 
88. 
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Coherence and Integration 
The key to a well-functioning narrative, one that generates adherents and compels them 
toward desired actions, is a frame that provides coherence to the otherwise kaleidoscopic 
array of  symbols, images, and arguments that pervade the public sphere.37 The frame 
provides the underlying organising idea that suggests to individuals how to interpret 
what is essential in any particular observed event—what consequences and values are 
at stake, how they ought to orient themselves to the post hoc environment, and how, 
ultimately, they should act. It is in effect a sort of  semi-permeable membrane comprised 
of  beliefs, as often as not unconscious and prejudicial rather than consciously logical, 
that filters individual and group perception of  reality like a pair of  polarised sunglasses. 
Some scholars have supposed that there are levels of  narrative. At the top level, master 
narrative is trans-historical, incorporating themes and stories that are widely known in a 
culture, frequently invoked, told, and retold over time.38 Then there are local narratives, 
which may be taken as the way someone explains the ‘here and now’.39 The function 
of  these local narratives is to ‘ground’ the master narrative in contemporary events, 
thus allowing individuals to perceive how their individual stories cohere with that of  
the larger culture. Where there is such coherence of  narrative, sometimes described as 
‘vertical integration’, the results can be highly compelling in terms of  mobilisation.40 
Clausewitz included ‘passion’ amongst the famous trinity that he argued constituted 
war, because he grasped that war requires society to cohere around the project that 
violence is aimed at achieving. The point is sufficiently basic in principle that it was 
hardly a unique insight of  the Prussian master. It is essentially the same truth to which 
Shakespeare makes Henry V give voice in his ‘Cry God for Harry, England, and St 
George!’ speech at the high point in his dramatisation of  the siege of  Harfleur: ‘On, 
on, you noblest English. Whose blood is fet from fathers of  war-proof!’41 In soaring 
rhetoric here, we see a straight-out appeal to a particular historical narrative—a grand 
cultural memory and consequent obligation on the present passed on from father and 
mother to son and soldier—and an evocation of  myth for the purposes of  imbuing 
Henry’s war with a palpable moral force. 
37 Ryan, Charlotte, and William A. Gamson, ‘Are Frames Enough’, in Jeff  Goodwin and James M. Jasper 
(eds.), The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 168.  
38 Halverson, Jeffrey R., H. Lloyd Goodall, and Steven R. Corman, Master Narratives of  Islamist Extremism 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 11.
39 Corman, ‘Understanding the Role of  Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication’, p. 36. 
40 Betz, p. 519.
41 Shakespeare, William, Henry V, Act III.
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After Clausewitz, others made similar sorts of  argument. The late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century French philosopher Georges Sorel, for example, is remembered 
primarily for his Reflections on Violence in which he remarked:
…men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming 
action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These constructions, 
knowledge of  which is so important for historians, I propose to call ‘myths’.42
Myth construction is an aspect of  power that the West has taught itself  to mistrust 
(because of  its experience of  wars of  mass mobilisation) and, by and large, to abjure, 
for ill and for good. For its materially weaker opponents there is no similar luxury of  
restraint. They compete hard discursively because the odds of  competition in other 
ways are foregone. So long as the ‘moral force’ that animates their adherents is secure 
and coherent, they can continue to score painful hits and to reconstitute themselves 
after taking hits in return. In Sorel’s terms, one side in the ‘war of  ideas’ is better 
at convincing itself  that the work in which it is engaged is serious, formidable, and 
sublime—and that is enough to keep them in the game, perhaps even to win.
Countering Violent Extremism
Narrative came to the high importance it now possesses in strategic studies at first 
very slowly, before 11 September 2001, and then very rapidly after. In the mid-1960s 
communications guru Marshall McLuhan described the Cold War as a ‘war of  icons’, 
an ideational conflict in which material weapons were incidental to the deeper and more 
obsessional ‘electric battle of  information and of  images’.43 It is fair to say, however, 
that such ideas remained decidedly outside the mainstream for decades to follow, at least 
as far as strategy was concerned.44 
At the very end of  the Cold War, boldly and controversially, a handful of  scholars began 
to argue that conventional warfare had been radically superseded by unconventional 
warfare.45 In the mid-1990s a few suggested the possibility that an era of  grand but 
essentially de-territorialised ideational conflicts was dawning, on account of  the 
burgeoning digital connectedness of  the planet.46 On the whole, though, the attention 
42 Sorel, Georges, (T.E. Hulme, trans.), Reflections on Violence (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915), p. 
27. 
43 McLuhan, Marshall, Understanding Media: The Extensions of  Man [1964] (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 
37.
44 For example, The Makers of  Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age edited by Peter Paret 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), mentions propaganda only passingly and media not at 
all.   
45 Most significantly, Van Creveld, Martin, The Transformation of  War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
46 Arquila, John and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of  Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 
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of  the world’s defence establishments was on a simpler and more congenial tactical 
proposition known as the Revolution in Military Affairs—the idea that information 
technology would enable high-tech armies to win their wars quickly, cheaply, and 
decisively.47        
It turned out, though, that in the ‘Information Age’, a handful of  Muslim commandos 
equipped with plane tickets, box-cutting knives, and suicidal conviction could strike 
the global psyche with an act of  Propaganda of  the Deed48 of  a sort that nineteenth 
century anarchists could only dream of. Meanwhile, after a brief  appearance in the wake 
of  conventional military operations—first in Afghanistan in 2001, followed by Iraq in 
late March 2003—the hypothesised ‘happy time’ of  victorious high-tech, low-footprint 
expeditionary campaigns of  the War on Terror declared after the September 11 attacks 
devolved into a protracted, thankless, and invertebrate quagmire. 
The term ‘War on Terror’ was early on criticised for its faulty strategic premises and 
more generally as an example of  poor branding, despite which it has proved a very 
sticky label.49 It always had a prominent discursive dimension, particularly in its ‘war of  
ideas’ variant—a descriptor often invoked by national leaders keen to stress the ‘non-
kinetic’ element of  military operations to domestic audiences that were increasingly 
skeptical of  the war on which they had embarked. In 2005 the White House moved 
to rebrand it as the Struggle Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), but the effort was 
widely derided as opportunistic, euphemistic, and a bit pathetic.50 Under President 
Obama, who luxuriated in a much more agreeable relationship with the media, the 
term was successfully dropped (without much change in actual policy) early on in his 
first administration. The term ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ represents, therefore, 
yet another evolution in the efforts of  the West to re-brand the non-kinetic aspects of  
the fight against what began to be seen as a ‘global insurgency’.51
Countering Violent Extremism is, for the time being, the rhetorical state of  the art. 
What, then, is the violent extremist Islamist narrative and how is it performing relative 
to the putative counter-narrative deployed against it? The narrative actually consists of  
a multitude of  master narratives ranging from the master narrative of  the Pharaoh or 
47 Owens, William, Lifting the Fog of  War (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
48 Propaganda of  the Deed consists of  acts of  violence intended to create an ‘ideological impact dispro-
portionate to the act itself ’. Bolt, Neville, David Betz and Jaz Azari, Propaganda of  the Deed 2008: Under-
standing the Phenomenon, Whitehall Report Series, (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2008), p. 2.
49 See Howard, Michael, ‘A Long War’, Survival, Vol. 48., №. 4 (Winter 2006–2007), pp. 7–14.
50 Kaplan, Fred, ‘Say G-Wot’, Slate, (July 26, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
war_stories/2005/07/say_gwot.html.
51See Kilcullen, David, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of  Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, №. 4 (2005), 
pp.597–617, and Mackinlay, John, The Insurgent Archipelago (London: Hurst and Company, 2009). 
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the Jahiliyah.52 These master narratives include stories which have been manipulated by 
Jihadists to broadly argue that: 
1. Islam is under general attack by the unbelieving West aided by local apostates 
and turncoats; 
2. The actions of  believers against Islam’s enemies near and far are just, 
proportional, and sanctified; 
3. It is the duty of  good Muslims to fight or to support those who fight.53
We might add a fourth message that analysts have noted as a central piece of  the Islamic 
State’s narrative:
4. The reward for their sacrifices will be a tangible utopia embodied by the 
establishment of  a Caliphate.54
As a strategic value statement—a narrative frame for war—this is exceedingly clear. 
The statement of  the problem, the grievance, is demonstrably plausible to a significant 
fraction of  the target audience; the claim for the rightness of  resistance is resonant; and 
the injunction to support action flows internally and logically. This narrative attacks the 
base of  the will of  the enemy by suggesting that jihadists are ready to use any means 
to achieve their ends. Most importantly, the narrative frame is constantly energised by 
real-life events. Terrorist attacks confirm that the defence of  Islam is underway and that 
there are options for others to join the fight. 
They also provoke states to respond through legislation and demonstrations of  force 
that vindicate the four arguments above by confirming the perception of  Sunni 
victimhood.55 Since the rise of  the Islamic State, the lure of  the narrative is also 
enhanced by the prospect of  the nascent so-called Caliphate, which seemingly offers 
a viable socio-economic alternative. The narrative therefore sustains the passion of  its 
supporters by providing a multitude of  incentives and options to support what seems 
to be a viable and just political project. 
The truth or untruth of  any of  these points is incidental to the empirical fact that they 
are believed. A 2010 Pew Research report on global Muslim attitudes found that Muslim 
52 Halverson,  Goodall and Corman,  p. 185.
53 Quiggin, Tom, ‘Understanding Al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work’, Perspectives on Terror-
ism, Vol. 3, №. 2 (2009).
54 Winter, p. 28.  
55 Carter, David B., ‘Provocation and the Strategy of  Terrorist and Guerilla Attacks’, International Organi-
zation,  Vol. 70, №. 1 (2016), pp.133–173.
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publics overwhelmingly welcome Islamic influence over their countries’ politics.56 Polls 
dating back to 2007 show that a majority of  Middle Eastern Muslims support the 
goal of  establishing a Caliphate.57 In 2013, a worldwide survey found that 99% of  
all Muslims in Afghanistan, 91% of  Muslims in Iraq, and 85% in Pakistan support 
instituting religious law in their country.58 The Arab Youth Survey found that fear of  
the Islamic State was not the same as a longing for democracy.59 Moreover, what might 
be called soft support for jihadism is relatively common and widespread: Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine, and Tunisia all report double digit ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ favourable public 
opinion of  al-Qaida, while ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’ feelings for Islamic State occupies 
a lower but not inconsiderable range from two to ten per cent.60  While such hard-core 
activist minorities constitute only a few millions, the ideological tenets and values that 
these groups espouse are spread much more widely in society in concentric rings of  
relative affinity. 
The depth and intimacy of  the extremist narrative renders it akin to a monological 
belief  system that is, to a high degree, impervious to refutation.61 Believers easily make 
sense of  events which unbelievers cannot fathom.62 Confirmation bias allows seemingly 
rational people to skirt the cognitive dissonance otherwise produced by contrary facts, 
so long as the underlying monological belief  system is solid.63 For example, it renders 
extraordinarily brutal violence of  a sort that an outside observer might perceive as 
alienating, comprehensible, and just. To a population on the receiving end of  an 
56 The Pew Research Centre, Global Muslims Attitudes Report (2010), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2010/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Report-FINAL-Decem-
ber-2-2010.pdf  .
57 World Public Opinion, ‘Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda’ 
(April 2007), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf  
58 The Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and 
Society (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center: 2013), p. 15, 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf
59 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, Arab Youth Survey (2016), p. 26, http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/up-
loads/whitepaper/2016-AYS-Presentation-EN_12042016100316.pdf
60 Lia, Brynjar, New ME Report 2015–2016 (University of  Oslo, Department of  Culture Studies and 
Oriental Languages),
http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/projects/new-middle-east/publications/2015-2016/bl-r-
2016.pdf. 
61 Swami, Viren, Rebecca Coles, Stefan Stieger, Jakob Pietschnig, Adrian Furnham, Sherry Rehim, and 
Martin Voracek, ‘Conspiracist Ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of  a Monological Belief  System 
and Associations Between Individual Psychological Differences and Real-world and Fictitious Conspiracy 
Theories’, British Journal of  Psychology, Vol. 102, №. 3 (2011), p .445. 
62 Newheiser, Anna-Kaisa, Miguel Farias, and Nicole Tausch, ‘The Functional Nature of  Conspiracy Be-
liefs: Examining the Underpinnings of  Belief  in the Da Vinci Code Conspiracy’, Personality and Individual 
Differences, Vol. 51, №. 8,  (2011), pp. 1007–1011.
63 Swami et al, p. 459.
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aerial bombing campaign, the symbolism of  the Islamic State killing a Jordanian pilot 
by setting him on fire in a cage and burying him in rubble was quite obvious.64 The 
undoubtedly horrific theatre of  Islamic State executions does not mean that its authors 
are unhinged; on the contrary, top propagandists and commanders set the parameters 
of  violence carefully on the basis of  a seemingly astute measure of  its likely impact.65
A recent study of  German foreign fighters, for instance, found that 48% of  returnees 
who have witnessed the Islamic State’s brutality first hand remained committed to 
extremist ideology.66 This palliative mechanism is compounded by the increasingly 
siloed nature of  information flows created by proliferating media channels, and the 
way the algorithms that underpin the profit-making strategies of  the Internet’s main 
platforms are creating self-validating echo chambers.67 Extremist narratives, therefore, 
are inherently resistant to external deconstruction because they are bolstered by the 
technological infrastructure that sustains modern communications.
The strategic communications of  jihadists have been described as a striking combination 
of  loose structure and strong coherence—‘many storytellers, one story’, as one observer 
put it.68 In this respect it bears comparison with the ideals of  ‘mission tactics’, a central 
component of  manoeuvre warfare, which holds that in order to maintain a high tempo 
and take advantage of  fleeting opportunities for decisive action, the authority to make 
decisions must be decentralised. At the same time, unity of  effort must be preserved. 
In order to reconcile these potentially contradictory impulses superiors need to tell 
subordinates what is to be achieved and why (i.e. to explain the ‘commander’s intent’), 
while allowing them much latitude in deciding how exactly to go about it. A corollary of  
expecting subordinates to show a high degree of  initiative is that errors resulting from 
mistaken initiative must be seen as ‘teachable moments’ rather than career-ending debacles. 
64 Reed, John and Erika Solomon, ‘Video shows Jordanian pilot “burned alive” by Isis’, Financial Times (3 
February 2015).
65 For examples of  the ways in which the Islamic State uses the dissemination of  images of  graphic 
violence to achieve strategic see Phillips, Vaughan, ‘The Islamic State’s Strategy: Bureaucratising the 
Apocalypse Through Strategic Communications’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2016), p. 10.
66 Bewarder, Manuel and Florian Flade, ‘Manche kommen zurück, um sich zu erholen’, Welt (28 Novem-
ber 2016), 
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159797782/Manche-kommen-zurueck-um-sich-zu-erho-
len.html. 
67 Thomas, Jem, ‘Breaching the Barricades: Biased Algorithms and Countering Violent Radicalisation’ (15 
June 2016), 
http://www.albanyassociates.com/notebook/2016/06/breaching-the-barricades-biased-algo-
rithms-and-countering-violent-radicalization/.
68 Winter, Charlie, ‘The Battle for Mosul: Analysis of  ISIS Propaganda’, presentation at conference of  
the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications on The Informational Dimension of  Hybrid Warfare 
(London: 12 January 2017).   
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This tolerance for mistakes and risk-taking is sustained by a decentralised and loose 
structure, which does not mean that it is ‘leaderless’ or unorganised. For example, in line 
with its pretensions as a state,69 the Islamic State has a number of  official media outlets, 
but relies on its ability to inspire its network of  supporters by carefully choreographed 
acts of  Propaganda of  the Deed. There is, in fact, a feedback cycle between its physical 
activities and the digital response of  its supporters, which can appear at times to be self-
sustaining in the same way that corporations inspire consumers through experiential 
marketing cycles.70 Within this decentralised system, the role of  leadership is to set goals 
and parameters on operations and not so much to determine specific tactics. Fog and 
friction are seen as normal because war is the realm of  unpredictability, uncertainty, 
and rapid change, and therefore the goal is to operate within them while magnifying 
their effects on one’s opponent.71 Instead of  directive command and control, there is 
a system of  leadership and monitoring and a cultivation of  implicit communication 
based on shared ways of  thinking rather than explicit communications based on rules 
and procedures.72 This implicit communication is symptomatic of  the way the different 
nodes in the information network are all very familiar with the multitude of  stories in 
their narrative system and the way they can be used to frame events.
By contrast, the West’s counter-narrative strategy is riddled with obvious narrative 
humbug, wishful thinking, incoherently muddled goals and methods, and the sort of  
operational fratricide that comes from over-bureaucratisation. The gist of  it, according 
to both the USA and the UK, is that extremism is to be defeated by the empowerment 
of  local partners.73 In the words of  a think-tank friendly to the policies of  the Obama 
administration:
Local voices hold more credibility with local populations and are best positioned to 
gather opposition to extremists. Americans can help to amplify those voices [...]. By 
linking activists around the world, civil society organizations can convey critical new 
skills to counter extremist propaganda.74 
69 Phillips, p. 5.
70 Idem, p. 16.
71 Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 7. 
72 Winter, Charles, Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’  (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), p. 28.
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL- documenting-the-virtu-
al-caliphate.pdf, pp.12-12. 
73 Executive Office of  the President of  the United States, ‘Strategic Implementation Plan for Empower-
ing Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In the United States’, December 2011,   
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf. 
74 Lord, Kristin M., John A. Nagl, and Seth D. Rosen, Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent 
Islamist Extremism (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009), pp. 13–14, 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets_Capstone%20
Essay_June09.pdf.  
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This is humbug. Unsurprisingly, the counter-narrative strategy has made hardly a dent 
in the Islamic State’s narrative because it is self-baffling waffle and largely blind to the 
cultural context that sustains the narrative it purports to counter. For one thing, open 
Western funding of  local organisations, such as the Sawab Centre in Abu Dhabi, is 
normally conditional on their promoting liberal democratic values.75 And yet these 
values are neither widely in particularly good odour in the region nor perceived as 
naturally culturally relevant, which obviously undermines the ideal of  empowerment. 
The attempts of  Western governments to work with local actors on the basis of  
supposed shared values76 undermines their ability to present themselves as organic 
parts the communities they seek to sway—there is no amplification. For another thing, 
attempts to keep Western funding of  local actors covert leaves the credibility of  said 
actors hostage to fortune, as they are potentially easily portrayed as stooges of  foreign 
powers, a measure of  reputation that no amount of  critical new skills will refute.77 
Counter-narratives lack the vertical integration of  extremist ones, as may be seen in 
their relative failure to generate large numbers of  voluntary propagators. While the 
scale of  the propaganda machine of  the Islamic State has dipped as Coalition military 
operations have been ramped up, media production peaked in November 2015 at about 
75 See ‘Sawab Centre Launched in Abu Dhabi to Counter Daesh Propaganda’, Gulf  News (8 July 2015) 
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/sawab-centre-launched-in-abu-dhabi-to-counter-daesh-
propaganda-1.1547345. The idea that the US can support a ‘moderate’ form of  Islam which is embraces 
Western values is popular. In 2007, for example, the RAND Corporation encouraged the US government 
to amplify liberal voices in Muslim civil society: Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and 
Peter Sickle, Building Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG574.pdf. The link  be-
tween democracy promotion and foreign aid is also clearly expressed by the US Agency for International 
Development in USAID Strategy On Democracy Human Rights and Governance, (Washington, DC: US Agency 
for International Development, June 2013), p. 7,  
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID%20DRG_%20final%20final%20
6-24%203%20(1).pdf  
76  In the UK, the value-centric approach to CVE was clearly signalled by David Cameron’s refusal to 
work with local organisations or individuals who did not subscribe to ‘core liberal values’. See Therese 
O’Toole, Nasar Meer, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Stephen H Jones and Tariq Modood, ‘Governing 
through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim Engagement’, Sociology, Vol. 50. №. 
1 (2016), pp. 160–177. 
77 A number of  domestic and foreign CVE counter-narrative campaigns have been revealed to have 
received government funding. See Ben Hayes and Asim Qureshi, ‘Going Global: The UK Government’s 
“CVE” Agenda, Counter-radicalisation and Covert Propaganda’, The Transnational Institute, (10 May 2016), 
https://www.tni.org/en/article/going-global-the-uk-governments-cve-agenda-counter-radicalisa-
tion-and-covert-propaganda and Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans, and Mona Mahmood, ‘How Britain 
funds the “propaganda war” against Isis in Syria’, Guardian (3 May 2016),  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/how-britain-funds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-
in-syria. 
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62 unique media products per day.78 To reach this scale, the Islamic State relies on an army 
of  highly industrious volunteer cyber activists who supplement the media production 
of  official media outlets, effectively allowing the Islamic State to outsource media 
production to its online supporters, who then help it reach new audiences.79 To respond 
to this propaganda, governments are relying on traditional bureaucratic mechanisms 
to amplify the voices of  identified partners. However, relying on government funding 
ties these local actors to complicated, slow, and risk-averse governmental executive 
processes. This undermines their ability to work in a responsive and creative manner. 
Another failing of  Western strategic communications is the inability to maintain unity 
of  effort. The West’s attempts to carry out strategic communications in respect to 
the Islamic State through a vast coalition of  NATO’s twenty-nine member states plus 
forty-one associates, each with their own agendas and priorities, effectively torpedoes 
consistency. The result is a painfully visible say-do gap in which actions consistently fail 
to match words. In a comprehensive review by the Strategic Communications Centre 
for Excellence of  its strategic communications in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014, 
NATO itself  stated that ‘the communication effort regularly fell apart at the policy and 
operational execution levels.’80 Instead of  a coherent master-narrative-reinforced set 
of  communications and actions driving towards a specific end state, there has been a 
complex multi-lateral communications programme, involving actors proceeding from 
distinctly different cultures and beliefs, producing a repetitive sequence of  their own goals. 
These failings in the implementation of  the counter-narrative approach point to 
another flaw in the counter-narrative: an incoherent philosophy of  war. Many examples 
of  counter-narrative videos are directed at undermining values and ideological concepts 
rather than concrete enemies. Even though some counter-narrative media output does 
target groups such as the Islamic State, apart from asking people to reject that group 
and everything it stands for, the end state to be achieved by rejection and resistance is 
not outlined, nor is it explained how exactly resistance is to be manifested in individual 
action.81 In other words, they do not seek to answer the actual motivations of  the 
78 Winter, Charlie, Presentation at ISIS in Europe Conference (London: International Centre for the Study 
of  Radicalisation and Political Violence, 27–28 July 2016). 
79 See Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger, J.M., ISIS: The State of  Terror (London: Ecco, 2015), p. 155 and 
Winter, p. 36.  
80 Boudreau, Brett, ‘We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us’: An Analysis of  NATO Strategic Communications: 
The International Security Force in Afghanistan, 2003–2015, (Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre 
of  Excellence, 2016), p. 28.
81 For examples of  counter-narrative videos see YouTube videos posted on channels such as Abdul-
lah X, https://www.youtube.com/user/abdullahx, Average Mohammed , https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7vJ-SlxjRrQ, as well as campaigns managed by the Quilliam Foundation, Open Your Eyes, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9seUFUQZY4o, and Not Another Brother, https://www.youtube.
com/channel/UCkig5UnjzDktdOB1otwK1pw 
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persons whose hearts and minds are supposed to be won and swayed. 
This failure is symptomatic of  the reactive nature of  counter-narrative work. Designed 
to ‘discredit messaging of  a violent extremist nature’,82 it is designed to encourage not 
vertical integration but refutation of  a narrative system. Indeed, Braddock and Horgan 
note that ‘the effectiveness of  any counter-narrative will be partially contingent on the 
degree to which it contradicts the themes intrinsic to a terrorist narrative’.83 However, 
as mentioned above, not only is the monologic DNA of  the jihadist narrative system 
particularly good at resisting refutation, without a clear desired end state and a sense of  
the enemy whose will is contested the counter-narrative will fail to generate adherents 
who feel compelled toward desired actions.  
By contrast, as outlined above, the end state of  the Islamist extremist narrative is 
clear, the methodology of  achieving it is plausible if  not desirable, and it is backed by 
credible sanction. In combination, these qualities make it convincing to a noteworthy 
minority fraction of  the target population. The success of  the Islamic State’s strategic 
communications cannot therefore be explained by the way they play freely with the 
‘truth’ as perceived by the West, but instead it is in their ability to align all the narrative 
layers to generate intuitive truth (or what Steven Colbert calls ‘truthiness’), which 
explains why they are so persuasive.84 
In fact, the narrative system of  jihadists serves the function of  the inhospitable terrain 
that Mao saw as a crucial force multiplier of  insurgency. The ‘Long March’ of  the 
Chinese communists was literally a long march through some especially desolate pieces 
of  the country where their enemies could not follow (and which even so killed nine 
out of  ten of  its original participants); the Islamic State uses its ‘indigenous privilege’ 
to communicate with, and to preserve a reproducible kernel of  itself  amongst the 
population of  the Islamic world through devices provided by the fabric of  their culture. 
The Islamic State does not communicate according to different set of  rules, it only 
applies the ones that do exist.
Tellingly, poor understanding of  the motivations of  foreign populations was also 
cited as a major flaw in the aforementioned Strategic Communications Centre of  
82 Ferguson, Kate, Countering Violent Extremism Through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of  
the Evidence, (Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, 1 March 2016), p. 5, http://www.
paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Me-
dia-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf. 
83 Braddock, Kurt and John Horgan, ‘Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternar-
ratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 39, № 5 (2016), p. 391. 
84 Shlossberg, Mallory ‘One Of  The Best Moments On “Colbert Report” Was When He Coined “Truth-
iness” In 2005’, Business Insider UK, (18 December 2014), http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-colbert-re-
port-truthiness-clip-2014-12?r=US&IR=T
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Excellence’s review.85 The review notes that NATO’s strategic communications 
campaign in the country was heavily informed by marketing and advertising techniques, 
much less by an understanding of  the diverse aspirations and beliefs of  the Afghan 
people.86 The experience in Afghanistan and the surveyed attitudes and opinions of  the 
region’s populations should make us consider whether the ongoing counter-narrative 
programming vis-a-vis the Islamic State has carried out a sufficiently robust target 
audience analysis. Without a deeper appreciation of  the narrative system of  the target 
population, the Western counter-narrative will never undermine the will of  its opponent 
or be able to sustain the passion of  the supporters it seeks to galvanise.
Conclusion
A cynical reader might wonder, given what we have written, whether any cultural 
outsider would ever be in a position to shape the beliefs and ideals of  another from the 
inside, as it were, subtly and without one’s interference being seen as suspect and self-
serving, essentially alien and corruptive. This is a good question that we would suggest, 
if  not answered honestly, enthusiastically, and affirmatively, ought to be taken as a sign 
not to attempt to do such a thing in the first place, given a choice.  
Inter-civilisational conflicts are comparatively rare in history, which is good because the 
best known of  them are essentially exterminatory. Most of  the Western history of  war 
is intra-civilisational, and that has been soberingly awful enough. The current conflict 
between the West and the Islamic State possesses a slippery-slopedness that should 
frighten everyone involved in it, however tangentially. In the words of  one historian 
who has attempted to grasp it in total historical perspective: 
With each attack the enemy has come to be conceived in broader and more general 
terms. Once the enemy was a religion, Christianity, Judaism, then it was a particular 
power: the British, the French, the Americans. Now it is merely the ‘West’. The 
Western response to this has been mixed. With each successive attack hostility, not 
merely to Islamic extremists, but to Islam in general, has grown. And that hostility 
has, inevitably, fuelled the conviction of  even the more moderate Muslims that Western 
civilisation, in whatever shape it might take, is bent upon their destruction.87     
It is often remarked that war is a very blunt instrument for the resolution of  questions—
it is dispiriting that the ultima ratio rex is the mouth of  a cannon; but it does have 
some noteworthy quality, to wit, its effectiveness in cross-cultural communication—the 
85 Boudreau, pp. 10, 30, 33, & 48.
86 Idem, 48.
87 Pagden, Anthony, Worlds at War: The 2,500 Year Struggle Between East and West (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008), p. 444. 
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jagged knife on the bare neck translates very clearly. 
Strategic communicators, in the West at any rate, too often convince themselves that 
they are a subtler and more powerful tool than in fact they are or ever could be. It is 
no surprise that ‘war by other means’, a mantra held dearly by those who believed 
so earnestly in the power of  information systems to produce cheap and practically 
bloodless victories a generation ago, a belief  now totally ruined by its sharp encounter 
with reality, is so popular amongst them. It is a fallacy. Strategic communications is, at its 
best, a red flag to a bull—a mystifying device behind which there is the sharp point of  
a sword toward which one’s enemy’s own momentum propels him. Without the sword 
there is just a matador dressed in too-tight sequined trousers about to be trampled and 
perforated by an angry animal many times his size.     
Strategic communications is an intrinsic element of  war; it is not a device for achieving 
things on its own, more cheaply, quietly, or agreeably, which we cannot or will not 
contemplate achieving by other means of  forcing compliance; it is an adjunct of  
force—otherwise supportive, contributive, potentially supernumerary, not a thing by 
itself. It is something of  a cliché now to quote Clausewitz’s injunction that the supreme 
act and most far-reaching act of  the statesman and commander is to establish ‘the kind 
of  war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
something that is alien to its nature’.88 Nonetheless, it is true.
Attempting to deconstruct complex narrative systems alien to its own, the West’s counter-
narrative approach fails to match its adversary’s agility, credibility, and propensity to take 
risk. The narratives of  its foes succeed, not because they displace or counter the West’s 
narratives, but because they capitalise on the master narratives of  the population they 
care about. It is this population to which their communicators are intimately tied by 
individual and collective identity, whose perspectives they innately understand, and to 
whom they can precisely articulate the enemy, the picture of  their enemy’s defeat, and 
how that defeat should be accomplished.
Countering violent extremism in strategic communications terms, on the other hand, 
has become a ‘substitute for real politico-military strategy and actions’ at a point 
where the time for words substituting for deeds has passed.89 It has already been seven 
years since a senior American commander remarked that, ‘We have allowed strategic 
communication to become a thing instead of  a process, an abstract thought instead of  
a way of  thinking. It is now sadly something of  a cottage industry.’90  
88 Clausewitz, p. 100. 
89 Idem, p. 19.
90 Mullen, Michael. ‘Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics’, Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 55, 4th 
quarter (October 2009), p. 2.
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Western governments, therefore, need to choose areas domestically and abroad where 
policy and programming can work synergistically, either where the socio-political and 
economic conditions already accommodate counter-narratives, or where new policies 
can change the status quo. In June 2013 at the London Global Counterterrorism 
Forum it was recommended as best practice to strategic communicators that they ‘take 
a strategic approach to [their] communications work and articulate the totality of  a 
government’s engagement on a given issue’, that messages should be ‘simple, concise, 
tailored, and delivered by credible messengers’, and that ‘policies must be aligned with 
messages in order to be credible’.91 In our terms, they need strategy in their strategic 
communications.
Until there is a calamitous event in the region that leads to escalations in the levels 
of  bloodshed on the order of  the Thirty Years War in Europe that simply exhausted 
the motive power of  the profound enmities that animated populations of  that time 
by killing a third of  them, whether actively or by disease or starvation, ideologies that 
argue that violence and terrorism are a plausible way to change an intolerable status 
quo will possess rhetorical traction. When these dynamics are in place, a credible native 
counter-narrative might emerge through an organic bottom-up phenomenon driven by 
the youth in the region.92  
Until then counter-narrative is mired in wishful thinking. It could be, as some analysts 
have suggested, that we simply have not yet harnessed tried-and-true communication 
theory to ‘construct and disseminate effective counter-narratives’.93 It is more likely that 
there are no effective counter-narratives to be disseminated by Western governments, 
which are facing their own storytelling crisis as evidenced by growing skepticism towards 
the liberal status quo and institutions such as the European Union.94 As the Middle East 
spirals into schismatic civil war, the West stands aghast with one eye on the waves of  
immiserated refugees and the other eye coldly regarding the likely shape of  the new 
status quo post bellum. 
91 Hayes and Qureshi, op. cit. 
92 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Voice of  a Frontline Researcher and Anthropologist– Scott 
Atran, podcast audio (13 May 2016), https://soundcloud.com/csis-57169780/countering-violent-extrem-
ism-scott-atran
93 Braddock and Horgan, p. 386. 
94 Walt, Stephen M., ‘The Collapse of  the Liberal World Orders’  Foreign Policy (26 June  2016) http://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/the-collapse-of-the-liberal-world-order-european-union-brexit-donald-
trump/. 
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